PART. I.


Right understanding is the most equally divided thing in the World; for
every one beleevs himself so well stor'd with it, that even those who in
all other things are the hardest to be pleas'd, seldom desire more of it
then they have; wherein it is not likely that all Men are deceived: But
it rather witnesseth, That the faculty of right-judging and
distinguishing truth from falshood (which is properly call'd,
Understanding or Reason) is naturally equal in all Men. And as the
diversity of our Opinions, is not, because some are more reasonable then
others; but only that we direct our thoughts several ways, neither do we
consider the same things. For 'tis not enough to have good faculties,
but the principal is, to apply them well. The greatest Souls are as
capable of the greatest Vices, as of the most eminent Vertues: And those
who move but very slowly, may advance much farther, if they always
follow the right way; then those who run and straggle from it.

For my part, I never presum'd that my Minde was more perfect in any
thing then an ordinary Mans; nay, I have often wish'd to have had my
thoughts as quick, my imagination as clear and distinct, and my memory
as large and as ready as some other Men have had. And I know no
Qualities which serve more then those to the perfection of the Minde;
for as for Reason or Understanding, forasmuch as it is the only thing
which makes us Men, and distinguisheth us from beasts, I will beleeve it
to be entire in every One, and follow herein the common opinion of the
Philosophers, who say, That there is only more or less among the
Accidents, and not amongst the Forms or nature of the Individuals of one
species.