1. Introduction, Kareem Khalifa, Insa Lawler, and Elay Shech; Part I: Understanding, Knowledge, and Explanation;
2. Can Scientific Understanding be Reduced to Knowledge?, Henk W. de Regt;
3. Should Friends and Frenemies of Understanding be Friends? Discussing de Regt, Kareem Khalifa;
4. Frenemies or Friends? A Reply to Kareem Khalifa, Henk W. de Regt;
5. Onwards, My Friend! Reply to de Regt, Kareem Khalifa;
6. Factivism in Historical Perspective: Understanding the Gravitational Deflection of Light, Sorin Bangu;
7. Ideal Patterns and Non-Factive Understanding, Mazviita Chirimuuta;
8. Topological Explanations: An Opinionated Appraisal, Daniel Kosti?;
9. Explanatory Power: Factive vs. Pragmatic Dimension, Juha Saatsi; Part II: Understanding and Scientific Realism;
10. Understanding the Success of Science, Christopher Pincock;
11. Truth and Reality: How to be a Scientific Realist Without Believing Scientific Theories Should be True, Angela Potochnik;
12. Defensible Scientific Realism: A Reply to Potochnik, Christopher Pincock;
13. Different Ways to be a Realist: A Response to Pincock, Angela Potochnik;
14. Realism About Molecular Structures, Amanda J. Nichols and Myron A. Penner;
15. Anti-Fundamentalist Lessons for Scientific Representation from Scientific Metaphysics, Julia R.S. Bursten; Part III: Understanding, Representation, and Inference;
16. Factivity, Pluralism and the Inferential Account of Scientific Understanding, Jaakko Kuorikoski;
17. Scientific Representation and Understanding: A Communal and Dynamical View, Collin Rice;
18. Representation and Understanding are Constitutively Communal but Not Constitutively Historical, Jaakko Kuorikoski;
19. Which Modal Information and Abilities Are Required for Inferential Understanding?, Collin Rice;
20. Maps, Models, and Representation, James Nguyen and Roman Frigg;
21. DEKI, Denotation, and the Fortuitous Misuse of Maps, Jared Millson and Mark Risjord;
22. DEKI and the Mislocation of Justification: A Response to Millson and Risjord, Roman Frigg and James Nguyen;
23. DEKI and the Justification of Surrogative Inference: A Response, Jared Millson and Mark Risjord;
24. How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem, Emily Sullivan;
25. Understanding from Deep Learning Models in Context, Michael Tamir and Elay Shech;
26. Link Uncertainty, Implementation, and ML Opacity: Some Clarifications, Emily Sullivan;
27. Expecting Too Much from Our Machine Learning Models, Elay Shech and Michael Tamir; Part IV: Understanding and Scientific Progress;
28. Understanding the Progress of Science, C. D. McCoy;
29. Scientific Progress Without Justification, Finnur Dellsen;
30. The Significance of Justification for Progress: A Reply to Dellsen, C. D. McCoy;
31. Scientific Progress without Problems, Finnur Dellsen.