아담 스미스의 도덕감정론 책. The Book of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, by Adam Smith


CONTENTS.
PART I.

Of the Propriety of Action.


SECTION I.

Of the sense of propriety Page 1.


CHAP. I. Of Sympathy ibid.

CHAP. II. Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy 9


CHAP. III. Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with our own 14


CHAP. IV. The same subject continued 19


CHAP. V. Of the amiable and respectable virtues 27



SECTION II.

Of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety 33


CHAP. I. Of the passions which take their origin from the body 34


CHAP. II. Of those passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagination 41


CHAP. III. Of the unsocial passions 46


CHAP. IV. Of the social passions 54


CHAP. V. Of the selfish passions 58



SECTION III.

Of the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in the other 64


CHAP. I. That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned ibid.

CHAP. II. Of the origin of ambition, and of the distinction of ranks 74


CHAP. III. Of the stoical philosophy 89



PART II.

Of Merit and Demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment.


SECTION I.

Of the sense of merit and demerit 97


CHAP. I. That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment 98


CHAP. II. Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment 102


CHAP. III. That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it 106


CHAP. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters 109


CHAP. V. The analysis of the sense of merit and demerit 112



SECTION II.

Of justice and beneficence 119


CHAP. I. Comparison of those two virtues ibid.

CHAP. II. Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the consciousness of merit 126


CHAP. III. Of the utility of this constitution of nature 132



SECTION III.

Of the influence of fortune upon the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the merit or demerit of actions 145


CHAP. I. Of the causes of this influence of fortune 148


CHAP. II. Of the extent of this influence of fortune 154


CHAP. III. Of the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments 167



PART III.

Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.

CHAP. I. Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame 173


CHAP. II. In what manner our own judgments refer to what ought to be the judgments of others: and of the origin of general rules 180


CHAP. III. Of the influence and authority of the general rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity 207


CHAP. IV. In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives 223



PART IV.

Of the effect of utility upon the sentiments of approbation.

CHAP. I. Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of beauty 237


CHAP. II. Of the beauty which the appearance of utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation 250



PART V.

Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.

CHAP. I. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon our notions of beauty and deformity 261


CHAP. II. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon moral sentiments 271



PART VI.

Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.


SECTION I.

Of the questions which ought to be examined in a theory of moral sentiments 291



SECTION II.

Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue 294


CHAP. I. Of those systems which make virtue consist in propriety 295


CHAP. II. Of those systems which make virtue consist in prudence 311


CHAP. III. Of those systems which make virtue consist in benevolence 321


CHAP. IV. Of licentious systems 331



SECTION III.

Of the different systems which have been formed concerning the principle of approbation 345


CHAP. I. Of those systems which deduce the principle of approbation from self-love 346


CHAP. II. Of those systems which make reason the principle of approbation 350


CHAP. III. Of those systems which make sentiment the principle of approbation 356



SECTION IV.

Of the manner in which different authors have treated of the practical rules of morality 367


Considerations concerning the first formation of languages, and the different genius of original and compound languages 389